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TIE ALBANY LAW JOURNAL.
that if he would labor for him, he would give him
one hundred acres of land, it was held that no
recovery could be had, for there was nothing which
the courts could enforce, or by which they could
ascertain the measure of compensation. But if the
contract had been to give a hundred acres of land
in a certain locality, or worth five hundred dollars,
so that a certain measure of the rights of the parties
could have been attained, the rule would have been
dilferent.(39) So where the promise was to give the
person "as much as he would to any relation on
earth," the contract was held void for uncertainty,
for there was no intimation or means of ascertaining
how much he would -give to any relative he had on
earth.(40) In all cases, express promises or contracts ought to be certain and explicit to a common
intent, or at least so that they may be rendered certain, by reference to something certain.(41) Absolute certainty is not required, but reasonable,
approximate certainty. Thus, where a person promises another that lie will render certain services for
him, he "will provide and give him plenty, so that
he will not need to work ;" no definite or certain sum
is fixed as the measure of compensation, yet it is
susceptible of being rendered certain to a common
intent, for by reference to the annuity tables, it can
be ascertained what sum will yield to the person an
annuity that will produce the result promised.(42)
Thus, in all cases where there is a promise to pay
any thing, the promise can be made certain by
applying the measure of reasonable value;(43) but,
if the promise is to pay in a specific kind of property, without designating the quantity, quality or
value, certainty cannot be arrived at, and the contract is void, for indefiniteness.

INCIDENTAL INJURIES FROM THE EXERCISE
OF LAWFUL RIGHTS.
A TORT consists in some act or omission by one
party whereby the lawful rights of another are invaded, obstructed or abridged. The elements of a tort
-are a wrong and a resultiang damage; there is no tort
where there is no wrong; and there is also no tort
where there is no damage. The wrong, however, need
not be one of intent, for the most innocent invasion
of one's rights is a tort, as well as the most malicious;
the malice being in many eases only an aggravation.
Neither is it essential that the damage should always
be tangible and susceptible of proof, for if a legal
right is trampled upon, the law will imply damage, and
the implication is conclusive.

In the present paper those cases will be considered
in which one person suffers an injury in consequence
of the exercise by another person of his legal rights.
Many such cases occur in which, although the injury
may be severe, the law will award no compensation,
(39) Sherman v. Kitsmiller, 17 S. &R. (Penn.) 45.

(40) Graltam v. Graham, 10 Casey (Penn.) 475.
(41) Sylvester's Case, 2 Rlile, 104.
(42) Thompson v. Stevens, ante.
(43) Sherman v. Kltsmiller, ante.
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there being no tort in the case because there is an absence of that wrong the concurrence of which with
damage is essential to an action. Negligence might
supply the wrong, but we now speak of cases of which
that is not an element.
It is almost impossible to conceive of a lawful action
that may not by possibility cause injury to another.
One man establishes a store which takes away from
the profits of a store already established; he erects a
mill, in consequence of which the value of another in
the vicinity is sensibly diminished-, (1) he collects his
debt, and the debtor's business is broken up to the
prejudice of others who were customers; he assists in
starting a new town, which draws away the business
from an older one; or ie gives to the public a park on
one side of a city, which changes relative values to the
prejudice of the opposite side; - in all these cases the
injury may be very perceptible and easily traced to
the cause which produced it, but there is manifestly
no ground for the suggestion that an action at law
should redress it.
Some other cases which must be decided on the same
ground do not at first view seem so clear. The case of
a house comanmding a fine view, which is cut off and
destroyed by the erection of a building otn the adjacent premises, may be taken as an illustration. The
injury here is very direct and special, and it seems to
take something from the man's property, and to deprive him it, a measure of its enjoyment. But on the
other hand, if every man might protect his view
against the improvements of his neighbors, it is manifest that it would give him such a control of adjacent
property as would preclude improvements, except
with his consent; and to protect his view would usually diminish the value of the neighbor's property
more than it would enhance his own. It was determined at an early day that an erection by one on his
own premises which obstructed the view of another
was not a legal wrong; (2) and the principle is held to
cover the case of a structure on the party's own hnd
which injures the value of business property in the
rear of It by cutting off the view from the street.(3)
The English law recognizes an easement in air and
light over adjoining premises, under some circumstances; but the courts of the United States regard
the doctrine which supports it as unsuited to the circutnstatces of this country, and incapable of beingapplied in our growing cities and villages without workThe injury
ing most mischievous consequences.
which one sustains by having the light and air as they
pass to his buildings obstructed and cut off by the
structures of his neighbor, will, therefore, support no
action. (4)
CollateralSupport of Lands.-A man may injure his
neighbor's premises by excavations made on his own,.
Such excavations are rightful up to a certain limit;
beyond that they are unauthorized. The common
law gave every man a right to collateral support for
(1) Palmer v. Mulligan, 3 Caines, 307, 313; Platt v. Johnson,
15 Johns. 213.
(2) Butt v. Imperial Gas Co., L. R., 2 Ch. App. 158.
(3) Aldred v. Case, 9 Coke, 58 b: Attorney-General v.
Dougherty, 2 Ves. Sr. 453. See Maynard v. Escher, 17 Penn.
St. 22"2.
(4) Parker v. Foot, 19 Wend. 309, 318, per Bronson, J.;
Mahan v. Brown, 13lId. 261; Myers v. Gemmel, 10 Barb. 537;
Cherry v. Stein, 11 Md. 1; Htcott v. Morris, 10 Ohio St. E23;
Mullen v. Stricker, 19 id. 135; Hubbard v. Town, 33 Vt. 295;
Pierce v. Fernald, 26 Me. 4361; Ward v. Neal, 37 Ala. 500.
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his own ground in its natural condition by the land of
his neighbor; and to that extent the adjoining lands
are subject to a servitude. But he has no right to support for the land weighted with buildings; and if an
excavation is made with due care and due notice, into
which his buildings fall, though without the buildings
the natural surface would not have given way, he has
no claim to compensation. The injury is incidental
to the exercise by his neighbor of a legal right; and a
party liable to such an injury must protect himself as
best he may. The rule is thus stated in an old case:
" If A be seized in fee of copyhold land closely adjoining the land of B, and A erect a new house on his
copyhold land, and any part of his house is erected on
the confines of his land adjoining the land of B, if B
afterward dig his land so near to the foundation of the
house of A that by it the foundation of the messuago
and the messuage itself fall into the pit, still no action
lies by A against B-inasmuch as it was the fault of
A himself that he built his house so near the land of
B; for he cannot by his own act prevent B from makIng the best use of his land that he can. But it seems
that a man who has land closely adjoining ny land
cannot dig his land so near mine that mine would fall
into his pit; and an action brought for such an act

would lie." (5)
Injuries by Animals.- A man may rightfully keep
domestic animals, and use and employ them as is customary. Others may be injured by them, but they
are not entitled to redress unless the owner or keeper
is personally guilty of negligence or bad conduct. If
he keeps an animal he knows to be vicious, ,Nithout
proper restraint, he is liable for the consequences; if
he drives a horse furiously, he may be held responsible
to one who is run over by him; but he is not liable if
he was in the observance of due care, and tli injury
was accidental. " If one does an injury by unavoidable accident, an action does not lie; aliterif any blame
attaches to him, though he be innocent of any intention to injure." (6)
iburlies from Fires.-No man can lawfully insist,
because of the possibility of a fire spreading to his
estate, that his neighbor shall not burn over his fallow
or destroy his stubble by fire. A fire for any such purpose, or even for amusement, is perfectly lawful, and
if the party setting it is guilty of no negligence, its
accidentally spreading to his neighbor cannot charge
him with an action.(7) The old rule was probably
more strict, but even that did not hold the party liable
where the fire spread from sudden storm, or other
cause which could not have been foreseen or controlled
by human agency.(8)
i7ijuries Inflicted in Self-Defense.- A man assaulted
has a right to defend himself, and with force and violence proportioned to the real or apparent danger. If,
in making such defense, an injury is unintentionally

(5) Wild V. Minstaley, 2 Rol. Abr. 565. The cases on this
subject are fully collected in Bigelow's Leading Cases on
Torts, 527, ct seq., and In Washburn on Easements, 542-564.
(6) Wakeman v. Robinson, 1 BIng. 213. See Weaver v.
Ward, Hobart, 134; Mammnac v. White, It C. B. (N. S.) 588.
(7) Clark v. Foot, 8 Johns. 421; Tourtelotte v. Ri.tebrool
11 Mete. 460; Scott v. Hale, 16 Me. 326; Ellis v. Railroad Co.,
2 Ired. 138 ; De France V. Spencer, 2 Greene (Iowa), 462;
Fahu v. Relchart, 8 Wis. 255; Mich. Cent R.R. Co. v. Anderson, 20 Mich. 244; Burroughs v. lousatonic It. It. Co., 15
Conn. 124.
(8) Tuberville v. Stamp, 1 Salk. 13; Ld. Raym. 201: Webb
v. Railroad Co., 49 N. Y. 420.

and without negligence done to a third person, this is
no tort, for n1o man does wrong or contracts guilt in
defending himself against an aggressor.(9) The salme
rt le applies to a proper defense of property; an illustratiou being the case of building a wall to prevent
the inroads of the sea, whereby a greater force of
w iter is expended on tie lands adjoining.(10) As was
said by L'ord Tenterden, in such a case, the only safe
rule to lay down is this: that each land-owner for
himself may erect such defenses for his lands as the
nucessity of the case requires, leaving it to others in
like manner to protect themselves against the common
elemy." (11)
Protecting against the sea, however, and protecting
against a flowing stream, or against the ordinary floods
of streams, are very different in their nature, and may
give rise to different liabilities. Proprietors upon the
bunks of natural streams are entitled to have them
Ili w ol in their natural course; and whatever embankment or structure tends to prevent this, or to inor lase the flow or force at times or in particular places,
to the prejudice of a proprietor, is as much a wrong to
il n as would be the diversion of the water ilto a new
channel.(12)
Among the most troublesome cases are those which
re'ate to the right of parties in waters which flow or
pais from the lands of one proprietor to those of alontler, either above or below the surface, and to their
rithts respectively to be protected against such flow
or passage when it would be injurious, or to insist
upon it when it would be beneficial. A few of these
ca ies will be mentioned:
(9) Scott v. Shepperd, 3 WIlls. 403; 2 Win. BIl. 892; Brown v
Kendall, 6 Cush. 292; Morris v. Platt, 32 Conn. 71; Paxton
v. Boyer, 67 Ill. 132.
(10) In England proprietors of grounds have In some cases
been held liable to trespassers who were injured by spring
gilS concealed on the premises, and of which the trespa!,ser had no notice or knowledge. The case is an exception to the general rule, and appears to be put upon the
ground that where one makes use of these dangerous instruments, humanity requires that the fullest possible notle- should be given, and the law of EIgland will not sanction what is inconsistent with humanity; in other words,
th,.t without such notice, the setting of spring guns is an
unauthorized act. Bott v. Wilks, 3 B. & Aid. 304, per Best,
J. See Dean v. Clayton, 7 Taunt. 489; Bird v. Holbrook, 4
Bilug. 628, and Jay v. Whitfield, referred to therein. The
keelping of ferocious dogs, or the setting secretly of dangerous traps, Is governed by the saile rule. Brock v. CopeA
land, I Esp. .03; Townsend v. Wathen, 9 East, 277; Sarch v.
Blackburn, 4C. & P. 297. It Is a little uncertain how far
thii principle can be carried, but doubtless it would be appiled Ill some other cases where that is done by one on his
owil grounds without sufficient reason, which might result
Ill loss of life or serious Injury to those inadvertently, or
even Intentionally, committing trespass thereon. It has
be(n often held tlat if one fall into an excavation upon
the land of another where he is not expressly or by InvitatliolInvited, he has no claim to compensation from the
ow br. Blithe V. Topiam, Cro. Jac. 158; Stone v. Jackson,
16 C. B. 199; Howland v. Vincent, 10 Mete. 373; Hargreaves
I).Deacon, 25 Mich 1. But if one dig a pit-fall with the
puposo to Injure trespassers, "humanity"
lay require
that he be held responsible: and perhaps he should be held
rese)onsible In any case of an unguarded excavation so near
the public way, that one lawfully using the way might,
without gross negligence, fall Into it.
(11) TIle King v. Commoners, etc., of Pagham, 8 B. & C.
354.
(12) See Gerrish v. Clough, 48 N. H. 9. Compare The King
v. Trafford, I B. & Aid. 873 ; Williams v. Gale, 3 11. & J. 231.
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.. Drawing off subterrane n waters to the prejudice of
another.-Lord Ellenborough expressed the opinion
in one case that a party who had for twenty years enjoyed the use of a spring on his own premises was
entitled to be protected in it against the action of an
adjoining proprietor, whose cutting for the purposes
of a drain on. his own premises drew away the water
from it.(13) But it is now the settled law of England
that excavations by a proprietor on his own grounds,
for his own purposes, will not render him liable for
the accidental injuries which his neighbor may suffer
in consequence of the drawing off of the water which
percolates through the soil. In the leading case the
complaint was that the defendant, by sinking pits,
shafts, etc., for mining purposes, had drawn off the
water of certain underground springs, streams and
watercourses on the land of the plaintiff, which he
had theretofore used for manufacturing and other
purposes. Tindall, C. J., in delivering the judgment
of the Court of Exchequer Chamber in favor of the
defendant, declared that the case " is not to be governed by tile law which applies to rivers and flowing
streams, but that it rather falls within that principle
which gives to the owner of the soil all that lies beneath the surface; that the land immediately below is
his property, whether it is solid rock, or porous
ground, or venous earth, or part soil, part water;
that the person who owns the surface may dig
therein, and apply all that is there found to his own
purposes, at his free will and pleasure: and that if, in
the exercise of such right, he intercepts or drains off
the water collected from underground springs in his
neighbor's well, this inconvenience to his neighbor
falls within the description of damnumn absque injuria,
which cannot become the ground of action." (14)
In this case the question of prescriptive rights was
expressly waived in the opinion of the court, but
in a subsequent ease in the House of Lords it became necessary to meet it, and it was met with a distinct denial that any such rights could be claimed in
sub-surface waters as they naturally percolated or
found their way in secret passages through the soil.
The facts in the case are stated by Mr. Justice
Wightman, delivering the unanimous opinion of
the judges, and they show that the complaint was
that the defendats by sinking a well for the supply of a town with water, had abstracted and intercepted underground water that otherwise would
have flowed and found its way into a stream on
which the plaintiff's mill was situate, and that the
quantity so diverted was sufficient to be of sentsible value toward the working of the plaintiff's
mill. The reasoning on the question of prescriptive
right we pass by, but on the main question the previous case in the Exchequer Chamber was fully approved, and some difficulties in the way of supporting
an action were so forcibly put as to seem unanswerable. A French artesian well was referred to, "which
was said to draw part of its supplies from a distance
of forty miles, but underground, and, as far as is
known, from percolating water. In the present case
the water which finds its way into the defendant's
well is drained from, and percolates through, an extensive district, but it is impossible to say how much
from any part. If the rain which has fallen may not
be intercepted whilst it is merely percolating through
(13) Balston v.Bensted, 1 Campb. 463.
(14) Acton v. Blundell, 12 W1.& W. 324, 353.
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the soil, no man could safely collect the rain water as it
fell into a pond; nor would he have a right to intercept its fall before it reached the ground by extensive
roofing, from which it might be conveyed to tanks, to
the sensible diminution of water which had, before the
erection of such impediments, reached the ground
and flowed to the plaintiff's mill. In the present case
the defendant's well is only a quarter of a mile from
the river Wandle; but the question would have been
the same if the distance had been tell or twenty or
more miles distant, provided the effect had been to
prevent underground percolating water from finding
its way into the river and increasing its quantity to the
detriment of the plaintiff's mill," Such a right, as
was well said, was too indefinite and unlimited to be
recognized, and it was rejected by the unanimous concurrence of the judges and the law lords.(15) The decision is understood to have settled the law for England, and it has found general acceptauee and concurrence ill this country.(16)
In Dickinson v. Grand Junction Conal Co., it was
remarked by the learned Chief Baron, that " if the
course of a subterranean stream were well known, as
is the case with many which sink underground, pursue
for a short space a subterranean course, and then
emerge again, it never could be contended that the
owner of the soil under which the stream flowed
could not maintain an action for the diversion of it, if
it took place under such circumstances as would have
enabled him to recover had the stream been wholly
above ground." (17) Confining this remark to the case
of an underground stream flowing inl a well-defined
and understood channel, there has been a general disposition to accept itas sound law.(18) But one claiming rights imm
such a stream will be under the necessity
of showing its existence. It will not be presumed
(15) Chasemore v. Richards, 7 H. L. Cas. 349. The case In
the court below Is reported in 2 H. & N. 168. On the same
point reference may be made to New River Co. v. Johnson,
2 El. & El. 435; Hammond v Hall, 10 Sir. 551; Smith v. Kendrick, 7 C. B. 588; The Queen v. Metropolitan Board of
Works, 3 B. & Smith, 710; Popplewell v. Hodgkinson, L. R.,
4 Exch. 248.
(16) Greenleaf v. Francis, 18 Pick. 121; Wheatley v. Baugh,
25 Penn. St. 528; Frazier v. Brown, 12 Ohio t. 29; Roath v.
Driscoll, 20 Conn. 533; Bliss v. Greeley, 45 N. Y. 671; N. A. & S.
R. R. Co. v. Peterson, 14 Ind. 112; Chatfield v. Wilson, 28 Vt.
49; Clark v. Conroe, 38 Id. 469; Chase v. Silverstone, 62 Me.
175. In two New Hampshire cases the doctrine of Acton v.
Blundell Is questioned; but it would hardly seem to have
been necessary to a decision of the actual controversies
that the point should have been passed upon in either case.
Bassett v. Salisbury Manuf Co., 42N. II. 569; Swett v. Cutts,
50 id. 439. In Parker v. B. & .I. R., 3 Cush. 107, It was decided that If in consequence of an excavation made for a
railroad track the water of a well on an estate adjoining Is
drawn off and the well thereby rendered dry and useless,
the owner of such estate will be entitled to recover damages therefor, In the same manner as for land taken for the
railroad ; "because the respondents did not own the land ;
they only acquired a special right and usufruct In it, upon
condition of paying all damages which might thereby be
occasioned to others." But see Commonwealth v. Richter,
I Penn. St. 467; N. A. & S. R. R. Co. v. Peterson, 14 Ind.
112.
(17) 7 Exch. 282, 300, per Pollock, C. B. In Dudden v.
Guardians, etc., I H. & N. 627, the same learned judge said :
"It is absurd to say that a man may take the water of such
a stream, even though it be four feet from the surface."
(18) See, particularly, Chasemore v. Richards, 7 H. L. Cas.
349, 373; Smith v. Adams, 6 Palge, 435; Wheatley v. Baugh,
25 Penn. St. 528; Whetstone r. Brower, 29 id. 59.
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that a spring comes from such a stream, biut rather
that it was formed by the ordinary percolations (if
water ill the soil.(19) But when a clearly defined and
well known stream is found to exist, rights corresponding to those in streams above ground may be recognized and protected.(20)
'2. Protection against Falling Waters and Snows.A man has a clear legal right to protect his premises
against falling waters and snows, though prejudice to
others may result. It the case of urban property he
may, in erecting buildings and making improvements,
do this to the extent of completely preventing the fall
of rains and snows upon his grounds, and tile only
restriction upon the right appears to be this: that adjoining proprietors owe such duties to each other as
the requirements of good neighborhood naturally impose; that each must so use his own as not unreasonably to injure his neighbor, but that this only obliges
him to use all due care and prudence to protect his
neighbor, and does not require that lie shall at all
events and under all circumstances protect him; and
ally injury that may result notwithstanding, the observance of proper caution, must be deemed incident
to the ownership of town property, and can give no
right of action. If one constructs his building so 11s
to cast the water therefrom upon the land of another,
he is liable therefor, not only to the occupant, but to
the reversioner; (21) but if he puts proper eav-troughs
or gutters upon his building for leading off' the water
upon his own grounds, and keeps them in proper order,
and is guilty of no negligence in this regard, an adjoining proprietor call have no legal complaint igainst
him for injuries resulting from extraordinary or accidental circumstances for which no one is in fault, but
such injuries must be left to be borne by those on
wholmm they fall .(22)
3 gra,'ing off Surface Watcr.-The drawing off of
surface water may affect adjoining estates uiLher as it
deprives then of the benefit of the ordinar3 flow in
natural watercourse, or as it increases the ordinary
flow in such watercourses, or as it casts water through
ditches upon adjoining lands, or so near to them that
the water percolating through the soil causes the
adjoining lands to be wet and unsuited to cultivation,
or unproductive. Im the first case, that is, where a
lower proprietor is deprived of the benefit of the
natural flow of the water, or of some portion thereof,
it is settled that he can have no remedy. As das been
forcibly said, one party cannot insist upon another
maintaining his field as a mere water-table for the
other's benefit. (23) On the other hand, it is equally
well settled that one may lawfully drain his lands into
(19) Hanson v. MceCue, 42 Cal. 303. See 3fosier i. Caldwell,
9 Nev. 363. In Angell on Watercourses, 9 157, tihe result
of the authorities is stated to be that "In order to
bring subterranean streams within the rules which govern surface streams, their existence and their course mubt
be to somne extent known and notorious."
(20) Cole Silver Mining Co. v. Virginia, etc., Water Co., 1
Sawyer, 470.
(21) Baten's Cise, 9 Coke, 53 b; Jackson v. Pesked, 1 M. &
S. 234; Tucker v. Newman. 11 A. & El. 40; Fay v. Prentice,
1 1,. G. & S. 828.
(22) Underwood v. Waldron, 83 Mich. Compare Bellows
v. Sackett, 15 Barb. 99 ; Hoare v. Dickinson, Ld. Itaym. 1568.
(23) Rawston v. Taylor, UL Exch. 869, per Platt, B. See
Broadbent v. Ramsbothiam, 11 Exeb. 602; Llvingston'v. McDonald, 21 Iowa, 160, 167; Waffle v. N. Y. Cent. It. It. Co., 58
Barb. 413; Thayer v. Brooks, 17 Ohio, 491; Colt v. La, iston,
86 N. Y. 217.

a natural watercourse, even though a lower proprietor is injured by the increased flow. (24) " For the
seke of agriculture-agri colendi causa-a man may
drain his ground which is too moist, and, discharging
ti e water according to its natural channel, may cover
up and conceal the drains through his lands; may use
rL alingstreams to irrigate his fields, though he thereby
diminishes, notunreasonably, the supply of his neighbor below; and may clear out impediments in the
nAtural channel of his streams, though the flow of
waterupou his neighbor be thereby increased. * * It
is not more agreeable to the laws of nature that water
should descend than it is that lands should be farmed
amid mined ; but in manyeases they caunot be, if anlincreased volume of water may not be discharged
through matural channels and outlets. The principle,
therefore,' should be maintained, but it should be prudently applied," (25) and it will not preclude the lower
proprietor erecting any such protections as may be
n(edful to guard his lands against the additional flow,
provided they do not intercept the passage of water
which would naturally pass on to his land. (26) In
Massachusetts it has been decided that one may erect
barriers to prevent surface water which has accuniulnled elsewhere from coming upon his land, even
though it is thereby made to flow upon the land of
another to his loss. "The right of an owner of land
to occupy and improve it in such manner and for such
purposes, as he may see fit, either by changing the
surface or tile erection of buildings or other structures
th 'reon, is not restricted or modified by the fact that
bi own land is so situated with reference to that of
ad ]liniig owners that an alteration in the mode of its
improvement or occupation, ill any portion of it, will
cause water, which may accumulate thereon by rains
aln1 snows, falling on its surface, or flowing on to it
ovr the sulfaee of adjacent lands, to pass ilto and
ov lr tile sanie in greater quantities or in other direcetiols than they were accustomed to flow.(27) The
po It of these decisions is, that where there is no
watercourse by grant or prescription, and no stipulation exists between conterminous proprietors of
land concerning the iflode ill which their respective
parcels sliall be occupied and improved, no right
to regulate or control the surface drainage of water
call be asserted by the owner of one lot over that
of his neighbor. COujs est soluin, ejus estusque ud
cea,um is a general rule applicable to the use and
en.loynlent of real property, and the right of a
party to the free and unfettered control of his own
land, above, upon and beneath the surface, cannot be
interfered with orrestrained by any considerations of
injury to others which may be occasioned by the flow
of mere surface water in consequence of the lawful
apiropriation of land by its owner to a particular use
or mode of enjoymeit. Nor is it at all material, im
the application of this principle of law, whether a party
obstructs orchanges the direction and flow of surface
waler by preventing it from coming within the limits
of his land, or by erecting barriers or changing the
(,1) Willialas v.Gale, 3 H. & Johnson, 231; Miller v. LaubaclK, 47 Penn. St. 154; Waffle v. Porter, 61 Barb. 130. See
Kauffman v. Griesemner, 26 Penn. St. 407.
(25) Woodward. J., in Kauffluan v. Griesemer, 26 Penn. St.
107, 414.
(21) Id. See Butler v.Pack, 16 Ohio St. 334.
(2") Citing Luther v.Winnisimumet Co., 9 Cush. 171; Flagg
v. Worcester, 13 Gray, 601; Dickinson v. Worcester, 7 Allon, 19.
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discharge it through an artificial channel upon the
level of the soil, so as to turn it off in a new course
after it has come within his boundaries. The obstruc- land of another, or so near it that it will flow over
upon such land to its injury. (34) A case in Ohio
tion of surface water, or aii alteration in the flow of it,
somewhat similar was decided in the same way. Ill
affords no cause of action in behalf of a person who
that case a part of the water which the defendant dismay suffer loss or detriment therefrom against one who
charged upon the land of the plaintiffwould naturally
does no act inconsistent with the due exercise of
have found its way there had the drain not been cut.(35)
dominion over his own soil." (28)
The question of liability where one improves his These cases seem to confine the obligation of the owner
of the lower estate to receive the waters flowing from
land by artificial drains, which cast the water upon a
the upper estate, to "waters which flow naturally
lower proprietor, is difficult. No doubt he may imwithout the art of mal; those which come from
prove them by filling up low and wet places without
springs, or from rain falling directly on the heritage,
incurring liability to a lower proprietor upon whom
the flow would be increased, (29) just as the public or even by the natural dispositions of the place." (36)
4. Collecting Water in Reservoirs.-A man may lawmay lawfully improve the streets and public grounds,
fully collect water in reservoirs on his premises. What
though the improvement may have the effect to cast
the corresponding rights of his neighbors are is not
the falling or surface water upon adjoining grounds.(30)
very satisfactorily determined. Beyond question they
A natural watercourse of course must not be stopped
have aright to be protected against any injurious conup, and the water turned back upon the lands of
sequences that might result from a negligent construcanother proprietor.(31) But "the true watercourse is
tion of the reservoirs, or from any want of care on the
well defined. There must be a stream usually flowing
part of the person constructing or maintaining them,
in a particular direction, though it need not flow continually. It may sometimes be dry. It must flow in in consequence of which the water might escape to
their injury, by percolation or otherwise.(37) Whether
a definite channel, having a bed, sides or banks, and
parties maintaining such reservoirs are not bound to a
usually discharge itself into some other stream or body
of water. It must be something more than a mere still stricter responsibility, is a question we do not
care to enter upon in this place. (38) Neither do we
surface drainage over the entire face of a tract of land,
occasioned by unusual freshets or other extraordinary deem it of importance to refer to more familiar quescauses. It does not include the water flowing in the tions relating to water rights. Our purpose has been
only to present some classes of cases which may supply
hollows or ravines in land %hi-h is the mere surface
proper illustrations of the general principle which is
water from rain or melting snow, and is discharged
stated atthe beginning of the present paper.
through them from a higher to a lower level, but which
Malice as an Ingredient in Torts.-As injury alone
at other times are destitute of water. Such hollows
does not give a right of action, neither, as a general
or ravines are not in legal contemplation waterrule, do injury and malice combined. There must be
courses." (32)
a combination of wrong and injury to constitute a tort,
In Iowa, in a carefully considered case, it was held
and rtalice is of itself a legal wrong. If one is only
that if a ditch made by the defendant for the purpose
of draining his lands, and which terminated within exercising his lawful rights, others call have no concern
with his motives. A man may establish a business
sixty feet of the line of the plaintiff, had the effect to
increase the quantity of water on the plaintiff's land with the malicious purpose to destroy the business of
to his injury, or, without increasing it, threw the his neighbor. This is no tort, whether he accomplishes
his purpose or not, for he had a clear legal right to
water upon the land in a different manner from what
the same would naturally have flowed upon it, to his establish a new business, and his motives in doing so
are not to be inquired into.(39)
injury, the defendant would be liable for the injury,
"An act which does not amount to a legal injury
even though the ditch was constructed by the defendcannot be actionable because it is done with a bad
ant in the course of the ordinary use and improveintent." (40) This remark was made in a case where a
ment of his farm.(33) So in Wisconsin it has been
landlord was charged with having maliciously disdecided that the owner of land on which there is a
trained for more rent than was due to him, but it was
pond or reservoir of surface water cannot lawfully
only the statement of a principle that is as old as the
(28) Gannon v. Hargadon, 10 Allen, 106, per Bigelow, Ch. J.
(34) Pettigrew v. Evansville, 25 Wis. 223.
(29) Goodale v. Tuttle, 27 N. Y. 459; Flagg v.Worcester, 13
(35) Butler v. Peck, 16 Ohio St. 334.
Gray, 601; Hoyt v.Hudson, 27 Wis. 656.
(36) Kauffman v. Griesemer, 26 Penn. St. 407, 413. See Mar(31) Martin v.Riddle, 26 Penn. St. 415; Luther v. Winnitin v. Jett, 12 La. 501. As to the right of the upper prosimniet Co., 9 Cush. 171.
to have natural passage for the surface water kept
prietor
(30) Parks v.Newburyport, 10 Gray, 28; Flagg v. Worcesopen for his drainage, though they are not watercourses,
ter, 13 Id. 601; Dickinson v. Worcester, 7 Allen, 19; Turner
v.Dartmouth, 13id. 291; Emery v.Lowell, 104 Mass. 16; Im- see Franklin v. Fisk, 13 Allen, 211; Goodale v. Tuttle, 29 N.
ler v. Springfield, 55 Mo. 119. If the proprietor of the ad- Y. 459; Tootle v. Clifton, 22 Ohio St. 247; aartin, ex parte,
13 Ark. 198.
joining lands protects them by an embankment which
(37) Monson Manuf. Co. v. Fuller, 15 Pick. 834; Fuller v.
throws the water back Into the road, the public have no
Chicopee Manuf. Co., 16 Gray, 46; Wilson v. New Bedford,
cause for complaint. Franklin v.Fisk, 13 Allen, 211.
(3*2)Dixon, Ch. J.,In Hoyt v.Hudson, 27 Wis. 656. 661. In 108 Mass. 261; PrixIcy v. Clark, 35 N. Y. 52.
(38) See Rylands v. Fletcher L. R., 1 Exch. 265; S. C., In
the same case an intimation In Bowlsby v.Speer, 31 N. J.
351, that there may possibly be an exception to this propoerror, 3 H. L. Cas. 330.
sition in the case of gorges and narrow passages in bills or
(39) Auburn & Cato Plank R. Co. v. Douglass, 9 N. Y. 450.
(40) Parke, B., In Stevenson v. Newnham, 13 C. B. 285, 297.
mountainous regions Is repeated. As bearing on the quesSee Floyd v. Barbee, 12 Coke, 23; Stowball v. Ansell, Comb.
tion, see Eulrich v. Richter, 37 Wis. 226.
(3) Livingston v. McDouald, 21 Iowa, 160. See Reynolds 11; Tayler v. Hunniker, 12; Ad. & El. 488; Heald v. Carey,
v.Clark, Ld. itaym. 1399; Lane v. Jasper, 39 Ill.54. The 11 C. B. 993; Clinton v. Myers, 46 N. Y. 511; Covanhoven v.
Hart, 21 Penn. St. 501; Jenkins v. Fowler, 24 Id. 308; Fowler
case of Adams v.Walker, 34 Conn. 466, the facts of which
are somewhat Imperfectly stated in the report, supports v. Jenkins, 28 Id. 176; Glendon Iron Co. v. Uhler, 75 Id. 467;
Smith v. Johnson, 76 Id. 191.
the same principle, and perhaps goes somewhat fuithor.
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common law. It has been applied in a case in which
a prosecution was alleged to have been instituted
maliciously, but where there was not an absence of
probable cause.(41) and to cases of alleged malicious
arrest of persons, privileged from arrest by being in
attendance on court on subpoena, or by other causes, (12)
and of maliciously issuing execution on a judgment
which had been entered up for too large air amount,
but which had not been corrected at the time suit was
brought. (43)
In Mahan v. Brown, the plaintiff declared against
the defendant for wantonly and maliciously erecting
on his own premises a high fence near to and in front
of the plaintiff's windows, without benefit or advantage to himself.and for the sole purpose of anto) ing the
plaintiff, thereby obstructing the air and light from
entering herwindows, and rendering her house unihabitable. The court held that the action would not
lie. "The defendant has not so used his property as
to injure another. No one, legally speakinrg, is injured
or damnifled, unless some right is infringed
The
refusal or discontinuance of a favor gives no cause of
action. The plaintiffin this case has only boen refused
the use of that which did not belong to hcr; and
whether the motives of the defendant were good or
bad, she has no legal cause of complaint." (44)
In the South Royalton Bank v. The Suffolk Rlank, the
same principle was involved. The defendants were
charged with having maliciously and with intent to
injure the plaintiff gathered up its circulating bills,
and taken them out of circulation, and afterward
presented them in quantities for redemption to the
injury of the plaintiff. On demurrer the court say:
" Motive alone is not enough to render the defendants
liable for doing those acts which they had a r ght to
do. It is too well settled to need authority that malice
alone will not sustain an action for a vexatious suit.
There must also be want of probable cause. This principle is enough to settle this case. If the defendants
could not be sued for instituting suits maliciously to
collect pay upon the plaintiff's bills, which they lawfully held, much less could they be sued for simply
calling upon the defendants for pay, without the intervention of a suit, though done with malice. It may
be true that sometimes the consequences attending an
act may serve to give character to that act, and the
rule has become established and grown into a maxim,
that a mail must use his own rights with due regard to
the rights of others; but this principle does not apply
to the present case. Here the act of presenting the
plaintiff's bill for payment has io natural connection
with any injurious consequences to follow from it, and
if such consequences follow they must be fortuitous,
and cannot give character to the act so as to render it
unlawful."(45)
The same principle was applied in the case of Ifunt v.
(41) Anonymous, 6 Mod. 73; Williams v. Taylor, 6 Bing.
183; Forshay v. Furguson, 2 Denlo, 617, 20; Anmerman v.
Crosby, 261nd. 451; Barton v. Kavanaugh, 12 La. An. ;2.
(42) Vandevelde v. Lluellin, 1 Keb 220; Maguay v. Burt, 5
Q1. 381.
(43) Huffer v. Allen, L. R., 2 Exeh. 15. See Gerard v. Lewis,
2 C. P. 305, In which Willes, J., says that the words "wrongfully and unlawfully are mere words of vituperation, and
amount to nothing unless they show a cause of action."
(44) Mahan v. Brown, 13 Wend. 261, 265, per Savage, Ch. J.
See Panton v. Holland, 17 Johns. 92.
(45) Bennett, J., In South Royalton Bank v. Suffolk Bank,
27 Vt. 505, 508.

Sinonds, in which the plaintiff declared against insurance officers for maliciously conspiring to refuse insurance on his property to his injury. As he had no
legal right to demand to be insured by them, it was
clear that they had a lawful right to refuse; and
whether they did this from good motives or from bad
motives was of no legal importance.(46)
The case of public officers who have discretionary or
judicial duties to perform is familiar. "The law will
not allow malice and corruption to be charged in a
civil suit against such an officer for what he does in the
performance of a judicial duty."(47) "If a jury will
find a special verdict; if a judge will take time to consider; if a bishop will delay a patron and impanel a
jury to inquire of the right of patronage, you cannot
bring an action for these delays, though you suppose
it to be done maliciously and on purpose to put you to
clarges; though you suppose it to be done scienter
knowing the law to be clear; for they take but the
liberty the law has provided, and there can be no denionstration that they have not real doubts, for these
are within their own breasts. and it would be very
mischievous that a man might not have leave to doubt
without sogreat a peril."(48) As was remarked in a
case in which a surveyor of highways was charged with
m fliciously working the highway in a manner detrinlloital to the plaintiff: "The true inquiry was,
whether the defendant had legal authority to do what
he did in the highway. If lie had such authority and
acted within the scope of it, be is not a trespasser,
because his motives or purposes with respect to the
plaintiff were unkind or malicious." (49)
Within this principle, also falls the case of one in
authority, who, under a discretionary power pertainin., to his office, puts a subordinate on trial for alleged
violation of the laws. The exercise of such a discretion
ca inot be a tort, even though bad motive or want of
pr bahule cause be charged.(50) Neither can the malice of
a witness in giving injurious testimony, nor the malice
of a party in making injurious allegations in affidavits
which he filesin the course of judicial proceedings
re ider him liable to an action at the suit of the party
aggrieved.(51) These cases are referred to as illustraticns merely; there are many others in which the same
pr nciple is applied.
It has been made a question whether the principle is
(46) Aunt, v. Slmonds, 19 Mo. 583.
(47) Beardsley, J., In Weaver v. Devendorf, 3 Denlo, 120.
See Floyd v. Bender, 12 Coke, 23; Evans v. Foster, I N. H.
377; Yates v. Lansing, 5 Johns. 282; S. C., In error, 9 id. 394;
La ing v. Bentham, 2 Bay, 1; Brodie v. Rutledge, Id. 69;
Pratt v. Gardner, 2 Cush. 68; Garnett v. Ferrand, 6 B. & C.
11; Dicas v. Lord Brougham, 6 C. & P. 14; Fray v. Blackburn, 3 B. & S. 576; Dawklns v.Lord Rokeby, 5 Q. B. 108; S.
C., In error 4 Fost. & Fin. 806.
(48) North, Ch. J.,in Barnardiston v. Soame, 6 How. State
Trials, 1099. See Scott v. Stansfileld, L. R., 3 Exch. 220.
Th subject was largely considered In Bradley v.Fisher, 13
Wall. 335.
(49) Thomas, J.,In Benjamin v.Wheeler, 8 Gray, 409, See
Sage v.Laurain, 19 Mich. 137; Thornton v.Thornton, 64 N.
C. 21.
(53)
Johnston v.Sutton, 1 T. R. 549; Freer v.Marshall, 4
Fo t. & Fin. 485; Dawklns v. Lord Pawlett, L. R., 5 Q. B. 94;
Da.vkins v. Lord Rokeby, L. B., 8 Id. 285, and 4 Fost. & Fill.
806.
(51) Damport v. Simpson, Cro. Ellz. 520; Bevls v. Smith, 18
C. :. 125; Henderson v. Broomhead, 4 ff. & N. 569; Can-,nhamnv. Brown, 18 Vt. 123; Dunlap v.Glidden, 31 Me.
435, White v. Carroll, 42 N. Y. 166.
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applicable in cases where one is dealing with surface
water, or water percolating through the soil of his
premises, to the injury of his neighbor. In Chatfield
v. WIilson it was applied without hesitation. The case
was one of gathering water on the defendant's premises which otherwise would have percolated through
the soil of the plaintiff, supplying a reservoir and aqueduct which had been constructed by him, and malice
was charged. " There are," it is said by the court,
"many cases in the books relating to the relative use
of surface streams, where the case has turned upon
the question whether the use was reasonable, and for
the party's own convenience or benefit, or wanton and
malicious, and done to prejudice the rights of another.
In such cases there are correlative rights to the use of
the water, and the boundary of the right is a reasonable use of it. But such cases have no analogy to the
case at bar, and it may be laid down as a position not
to be controverted, that an act legal in itself, violating
no right, cannot be made actionable on the ground of
the motive which induced it. Such was the case of
South Royalton Bank v. Suffolk Bank, 27 Vt. 505. If
the act is lawful, although it may be prejudicial, it is
damnnuim absque injuiqa. On this polut the case of
Mtahan v. Brown, 13 Wend. 261, is a direct authority." (52) This view appears also to have been accepted
In Ohio, "subject only to the possible exception of a
case of unmixed malice." (53) The intimations the
other way have, however, been very strong. Lord
Cranworth, in Chasemore v. Richards, expressed very
great doubt whether a party would be at liberty to abstract water on his own premises for the use, unconnected with his own estate, of those who would have
had no right to take it directly themselves, to the ijury of neighboring proprietors who would have had
an equal right with him.(54) In Massachusetts the instructions of the trial court, that if the defendant dug
the well which drew the water away from the plaintiff,
for the purpose of injuring the plaintiff and not for
the purpose of obtaining water for his own use, he was
liable for so doing, were very distinctly approved by
the court in bane.(55) And the Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania appears to have recognized the same
doctrine iu several cases.(56)
There seems to be some difficulty in laying down a
rule for these cases that will be quite satisfactory in
principle and in its workings. That a man may lawfully make an excavation on his premises for the sole
purpose of drawing away the water from his neighbor's well and rendering it useless, seems to be, and is
in fact, a monstrous doctrine. On the other hand it
cannot be held consistent with the authorities, or perhaps with reason, that adjoining proprietors have
rights in the water percolating through the soil, corresponding to those they may have in a running stream
which crosses their several estates. Such a rule would
raise questions of reasonable use, and create difficulties both of evidence and of application that would
make the right to such waters more troublesome than
valuable. The courts have doubtless been right in deelaring that one proprietor cannot Insist on another
(52) Chatfield v. Wilson, 28 Vt. 49, 57.
(53) Frazier v. Brown, 12 Ohio St. 294, 304.
(54) Chasemore v. Richards, 7 H. L. Cas. 39, 388.
(55) Greenleaf v. Francis, 18 Pick. 117, 122.
(56) Wheatley v. Baugh, 25 Penn. St. 528; Whetstone v.
Bowser, 29 Id. 59; Haldeman v. Bruckhardt, 45 id. 514. See,
also, Trustees of Delphi, etc., v. Youmans, 50 Barb. 516;
Waffle v. Porter, 61 Barb. 130.
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keeping his estate as a filter for the use of the f6rmer,
nor be heard to complain if the use by his neighbor of
his own estate draws off the secret particles of water
which otherwise he might have gathered.
These
waters belong to no one until they are collected, and
they may be appropriated by the one who collects and
puts them to use.
But though neither proprietor has such a right in or
control over the water as will enable him to complain
of his neighbor's appropriation, does not each owe
to the other certain duties of good neighborhood,
among which is the duty to abstain from purposely
withdrawing the water that may be useful to both,
when a use of it is not intended? Conceding that he
may collect it for use, does this entitle him to do so
not for use but of malice? If he sinks a well to supply his house or water his stock, it must be admitted
that no question can be raised whether this is or is not
a reasonable appropriation of the water; but if he digs
a hole to injure his neighbor, it is not perceived that
the two cases are necessarily to be governed by the
same rule. What is a man's right in respect to the
water percolating through the soil? The just answer
seems to be this: It is a right to gather and appropriate it to his lawful uses. When he does this, he is exercising his right, and his motive is not open to inquiry. But when he collects it, not for use but to
injure his neighbor, he exceeds his right, and there is
that conjunction of wrong and injury which constitute a tort and will support an action.- Hon. Thones
M. Cooley, in the Southern Lae Revieu.
THE SUCCESSFUL LAWYER.
following imaginary sketch of the career of a
successful lawyer, taken from the London Lae
Journal,is worthy of the perusal aid careful thought
of those young men who are entering upon tdreir professional life. It is taken from an address delivered
before the Leicester (England) Law Students Society
by the presiding officer, W. N. Reeve, Esq.:
"Placing before the members the imaginary career
of a successful man called 'Christian,' and supposing
him to have passed his preliminary examination, and
to have commenced his study in earnest, the intermediate and final examinations lie before him as two
lions, both of which can be overcome with a single
weapon, 'Industry.'
After mentioning the danger of
trusting to the memory rather than the reason, the
advisability of going to the foundations of English
law, and even to the Roman law, upon which so much
of our own civil law is founded, and of tracing the
growth of the law with the growth and history of the
uation, and thus being ready to argue from first principles, however much these may have subsequently been
modified by modern statutory enactments, was
strongly urged. The advantages of continuing classical studies in after life, and of valuing learning, not
merely as a passport to the profession, or even as an
accomplishment, but as a mental rest when wearied
with the conflicts of life, and as a solace and delight of
old age, were forcibly pointed out. After his admission as a solicitor 'Christian' commences practice on
his own account, and is beset by his first temptation.
Arich client offers him business of a questionable kind,
and on his answer depends all his future welfare. The
glory of his profession (that of an attorney) is his responsibility; and although, according to the etiquette
of the bar, a barrister may touch pitch and yet be undefiled, it is not so with the attorney. Having once

T HE

HeinOnline -- 14 Alb. L.J. 63 1876-1877

